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 ABSTRACT 
Can Fear Cause Economic Collapse? Insights from an Experimental Study 
by Antonio Guarino, Steffen Huck and Thomas D. Jeitschko * 
We study the behavior of experimental subjects who have to make a sequence 
of risky investment decisions in the presence of network externalities. Subjects 
follow a simple heuristic – investing after positive experiences and reducing 
their propensity to invest after a failure. This result contrasts with the theoretical 
findings of Jeitschko and Taylor (2001) in which even agents who have only 
good experiences eventually stop investing because they are afraid that others 
with worse experiences will quit. In theory, this "Bayesian fear" can trigger 
sudden economic collapse – even in the most efficient Bayesian equilibrium. In 
the experiment, subjects are surprisingly fearless of others’ experiences, and 
simply follow their own experiences, thus averting a total collapse. 
 
Keywords: Coordination, coordination avalanche, economic collapse, experimental  
 economics, network externalities 
JEL Classification: C7, C9, D8, E0, G0 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Kann Angst zu einem Wirtschaftszusammenbruch führen?  
Erkenntnisse aus einer experimentellen Studie 
Wir untersuchen das Verhalten experimenteller Subjekte, die in Anwesenheit 
von Netzexternalitäten (externen Effekten) eine Reihe von riskanten Investi-
tionsentscheidungen machen sollen. Die Subjekte folgen einer einfachen 
Heuristik – sie investieren nach positiven Erfahrungen, nach einem Misserfolg 
reduzieren sie ihre Investitionsneigung. Diese Resultate stehen im Gegensatz 
zu den theoretischen Befunden von Jeitschko und Taylor (2001), in welchen 
sogar die Agenten, die ausschließlich positive Erfahrungen gemacht haben, 
schließlich aufhören zu investieren, weil sie Angst haben, dass die anderen, mit 
schlechteren Erfahrungen, ausscheiden werden. Theoretisch kann diese 
"Bayesianische Angst" einen plötzlichen Wirtschaftszusammenbruch auslösen – 
auch in dem effizientesten Bayesianischen Gleichgewicht. Im Experiment sind 
die Subjekte überraschend furchtlos bezüglich der Erfahrungen der anderen. 
Sie folgen einfach nur eigenen Erfahrungen und verhindern so den totalen 
Zusammenbruch. 
                                                 
*  We wish to thank Dirk Engelmann, Wieland Müller, Hans Normann, Pedro Rey Biel, and 
Georg Weizsäcker for many helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the 
Leverhulme Trust and the ESRC via ELSE is gratefully acknowledged.  
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1 Introduction
In his first inaugural speech, in March 1933, as the world was in the grip of
the Great Depression, Franklin Delano Roosevelt told Americans “We have
nothing to fear, but fear itself.” Can we really consider fear causal for bad
economic outcomes? In a recent paper, Thomas D. Jeitschko and Curtis R.
Taylor (2001) suggested that this is the case: Fear can indeed generate an
economic collapse in a world of perfectly rational agents.
Consider a situation in which agents can invest repeatedly in a risky
project. The project can be good or bad, depending on the state of the
world. The outcome of the project also depends on the decisions of other
agents, as there are network externalities or complementarities in actions.
Agents only observe the outcomes of their own investments and then decide
whether to invest again and so forth. In such a situation, a global economic
collapse–a “coordination avalanche” as Jeitschko and Taylor put it–can
occur: Agents may be discouraged and stop investing even though they had
only positive outcomes.
At a first glance this result appears counter-intuitive. But, in fact, it
follows from a rather simple Bayesian logic: As time passes, agents have to
consider the possibility that there are other agents who have bad experiences.
After some bad experiences these agents will decide not to invest. Because
these agents drop out, the positive externality is not big enough for agents
who had just slightly better experiences than those with the worst experi-
ences. These agents, therefore, will drop out as well, and so on. Jeitschko
and Taylor show that this chain can go on in such a way that all agents
simultaneously abandon the investment. The local discouragement propa-
gates and triggers a coordination avalanche. Even if the state of the world
is good (and all investment opportunities are profitable), the fear that other
agents may abandon the project induces everyone to do so. Notice that
this is not the result of a pure coordination failure. Indeed, the collapse of
investment occurs in the Pareto—eﬃcient equilibrium of the game.
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In addition to its obvious macro—economic implications, the coordination
avalanche theory has many other interesting applications. Jeitschko and
Taylor, for instance, show that the avalanche can explain organizational
meltdowns: Agents may simultaneously abandon an eﬃcient organization
only because each one fears that his colleagues may do so. Similarly, the
fear that other agents may upgrade their computers may induce a sudden
and ineﬃcient shift to a new program, in order to keep compatibility with
friends and coworkers. In recent years it has also been argued that it is
diﬃcult to explain some financial crises by looking at the fundamentals of
the economy and that, instead, they seem triggered just by panic. Given
that network externalities are important in these markets, the avalanche
theory can also be thought of as a possible cause of these crises.
In this paper we discuss some implications of the Jeitschko and Tay-
lor model through an experimental study. In particular, we consider an
environment in which features of a coordination avalanche are present in
equilibrium, in order to ascertain whether these phenomena are observed
in the laboratory. Is fear a determinant of a bad economic outcome in a
laboratory market? Do subjects abandon a risky investment after observing
only good outcomes?
The answer of our experimental study to both these questions is no.
Subjects in the laboratory seem to follow a simple heuristic that is in stark
contrast with the perfect Bayesian equilibrium solution of the game: They
invest after they receive good outcomes. Once they have a bad experience,
their propensity to invest drops, on average, from almost 100 percent to
roughly 60 percent. While this behavior is not in line with individual pay-
oﬀ maximization (after failing, subjects should quit investing in order to
maximize their payoﬀs and even after successes they should stop invest-
ing at a certain point), it provides a public good because of the network
externality. Positive network externalities last longer than if subjects fol-
lowed the equilibrium path and, consequently, sudden economic collapse is
avoided. Because of this, the heuristic allows subjects to avoid “coordina-
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tion avalanches” and to earn payoﬀs similar to those in the Pareto—eﬃcient
equilibrium.
In Section 2, we describe the model and its Pareto—eﬃcient equilibrium.
In Section 3, we illustrate the experiment and the experimental design. In
Section 4 we report our results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theory
2.1 The model
We present a simplified version of the model proposed by Jeitschko and
Taylor (2001). Consider an economy with a continuum of agents with mass
normalized to 1. In each period, t = 1, 2, ..., T , agents are randomly paired
and called upon to play a simultaneous—move, two—by—two investment game,
akin to a stochastic version of the classic stag—hunt game.
At the outset of each period each agent receives an endowment of ω.
This can either be consumed completely (strategy choice “NO”), in which
case the agent’s payoﬀ is simply ω and the period eﬀectively ends for the
agent; or a portion c (< ω) of the endowment can be invested (strategy
choice “INVEST”).
In the case that the agent chooses “INVEST,” his payoﬀ depends on two
things: the choice of the agent he is matched with; and a chance move by
nature. If his partner chooses “NO,” the investment of c is forfeited and
the agent obtains a payoﬀ of ω − c. If his partner chooses “INVEST,” the
payoﬀ depends on a chance move by nature. Specifically, with probability p
the investment is a success, yielding a (net) payoﬀ of (ω− c)+S. Otherwise
(with probability 1− p), the investment fails, yielding a payoﬀ of ω − c.
Letting m denote the measure of the population that invests; an agent’s
per—period expected payoﬀ, u(x), for strategy x, is given by
u(NO) = ω, and (1)
u(INVEST) = (ω − c) +mpS.
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Agents observe only their own payoﬀs, but not other agents’ payoﬀs or
strategy choices (i.e., m), nor nature’s chance moves.
Provided that the success rate of investments, p, and the payout of suc-
cessful investment, S, are suﬃciently high compared to the cost of investing,
c, (i.e., pS > c), the one—shot game has two symmetric pure strategy equi-
libria: with all playing “INVEST” (m = 1) Pareto—dominating the all play
“NO” (m = 0) equilibrium. The one—shot game is then one of pure coordi-
nation.
Now suppose that while ω, c, and S are known values, there is uncertainty
about the magnitude of the intrinsic success rate of investments, p. In
particular, suppose that p is fixed over time, but takes one of two possible
values, p or p, both initially equally likely.
Suppose further that 0 ≤ p < c/S < p ≤ 1 so that investments are
expected to be profitable in the good state, but not in the bad state; and
E [p] :=
¡
p+ p
¢±
2 > c/S so that initially investment is collectively rational.
Assume that all agents have the correct common prior, so the game is
one of pure coordination–at least initially, at time t = 1. Assume further
that it is common knowledge that all agents tacitly coordinate on the good
equilibrium in the first period of play. Then, nevertheless, in the first period
some agents may experience failed investment outcomes while others do not.
Those with successful investment outcomes will attach more weight to the
likelihood that the value of the intrinsic success rate of investments is p;
those with failures find it more likely that it is p.
As p < c/S, if any positive mass of agents puts suﬃciently strong weight
on the state being bad, they will choose to play “NO,” and complete coor-
dination, in which m = 1, can no longer be achieved.
All agents can determine after how many failed investment attempts a
Bayesian agent, who assumes coordination amongst the population, will no
longer invest. And at this point, in addition to updating beliefs about p, all
agents must form beliefs about m. Thus, agents update their beliefs on the
success rate of investments, and must also account for a (negative) network
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externality, namely how attrition aﬀects the size of m.
As agents assess the decrease in m, they expect lower returns from in-
vesting. Consequently, it may be the case that agents with fairly optimistic
beliefs regarding p begin playing “NO,” due to the imputed negative network
externality caused by those who have become pessimistic about p.
A point may even come where agents with uniformly good experiences,
i.e., those who have never had an investment fail, conjecture that there is
suﬃcient attrition in the population to no longer warrant an investment.
At this point, despite agents having diﬀerent beliefs about the state of the
world, the only action supportable in equilibrium is the one in which all play
“NO” and m = 0.
It is important to note that whether such a point is in fact reached is a
function of prior beliefs and need not depend on the true state of the world.
In fact, even if p = p = 1, this type of complete attrition may occur. This
will be demonstrated in the parameterization chosen below.
2.2 Parameterization and the Pareto—eﬃcient perfect Bayesian
equilibrium
We turn now to illustrate the features of the model for the particular pa-
rameters that we chose for the experiment. Agents are repeatedly randomly
matched for a total of 5 periods. At the beginning of each period they are
newly endowed with ω = £1.70. The cost of undertaking an investment is
c = £1.64, and successful investments pay out £2.00 (per agent). There is
no discounting.
In the bad state of the world, the success rate is p = 0.8, whereas in the
good state is p = 1. Both states are ex ante equally likely.
We are interested in determining the longest string of playing “IN-
VEST,” assuming complete coordination. The assumption of complete co-
ordination postulates that an agent plays “INVEST” whenever all others
with equivalent or more optimistic beliefs do so. That is, we are look-
ing for a Pareto—eﬃcient perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Since E [p] = 0.9,
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if all agents invest in the first period, they receive an expected payoﬀ of
u(INVEST) = (£1.70 − £1.64) + (.9)(1)(£2.00) = £1.86, which is greater
than the £1.70 obtained from playing “NO,” so all agents invest in the first
period.
Under this assumption, if an agent experiences a failure in the first pe-
riod, the intrinsic success rate of investments is revealed to this agent to be
p = p (because there are no failures with p = 1). Thus, agents with a failure
in Period 1 will have full information and, as is easily verified, will cease to
invest–regardless of the number of people in the population that invest.
Agents who experience a success will not know the true state of the
world, but will increase the weight they place on the state being the good
state. In particular, the Bayesian estimate of the state of the world being
the good one after a success in the first period (when m = 1) is 5/9.
As they cannot be sure that no—one experienced failures, however, they
will anticipate that there may be some agents who quit investing in the
second period. Hence, assuming that all agents with a success in the first
period continue investing, an agent with a first period success expects to have
again a success for sure in the second period when investing with probability
5/9.
However, with the complementary probability of 4/9, he expects an ef-
fective success rate of only 64 percent (the probability of being matched
with someone who invests and experiencing a success with that person,
when the true p is p = 0.8). This yields a composite expected success
rate (E [pm] |success) of 0.84 and hence u(INVEST|success) = £1.74. Since
£1.74 > £1.70 = u(NO), all agents that experience a success in the first
period should also invest in the second period.
Agents who in the second period experience a failure also know that the
true state of the world is the bad state, for either they were matched with
someone who invested, yet their investment failed; or they were match with
someone who had previously observed that the state was bad, and hence
chose to play “NO.”
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On the other hand, those with a success in the second period will be even
more optimistic that the state is the good state. These agents, however, must
now account for the fact that if the state is actually bad, then attrition has
spread through two periods of play.
Bayesian updating now yields u(INVEST|2 successes) ≈ £1.68. So, de-
spite being rather optimistic about the state of the world after two consecu-
tive successes, it is no longer worth investing, because in the event that the
state is bad, attrition will have spread so far as to make investments very
unlikely to pay oﬀ.
This yields the following Proposition:
Proposition (Pareto Eﬃcient Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium) The strategy
profile that specifies that all agents play “INVEST” until they have
either experienced a failure in the previous period or have reached the
third period, and thereafter play “NO,” constitutes a Pareto eﬃcient
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PEPBE).
An implication of the PEPBE of the Proposition is that all agents play
“NO” in Periods 3 through 5, regardless of their experiences in the first two
periods, and regardless of the true value of p.1
3 Experimental design and procedures
3.1 The experiment
We conducted the experiment in the laboratory of the ELSE Centre at
University College London. We recruited subjects from the College’s under-
graduate population across all disciplines. They had no previous experience
1The PEPBE of the Proposition is not unique. Any prescription that involves all
playing “NO” in any three of the five periods, and prescribes maximal cooperation (in the
history—dependent sense above) in the other two, is also a PEPBE. We do not consider
multiple PEPBE a concern for the questions of interest as the Proposition gives a very
clear focal point. Nevertheless, we do address this issue in one of the treatments.
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with this or similar experiments. For each session of the experiment we re-
cruited 8 students. In total, we recruited 80 subjects to run 10 sessions (five
sessions for each of two treatments).
At the beginning of the sessions, we handed out written instructions (see
appendix) to all subjects. Subjects were made aware that they all had the
same instructions. Afterwards, subjects saw a simulated run of the exper-
iment on their computer screens. This helped them to understand all the
steps that they had to go through during the experiment, the timing of the
decisions that they had to take, and the information that they would have
received after each decision. Finally, we asked if there were any clarify-
ing questions. No subject had problems in understanding the experimental
procedures.
Each session consisted of a series of 15 rounds. Each round was a sequen-
tial 5-period game as described in the previous section. Let us illustrate the
procedures for each round. At the beginning of the round the software chose,
with equal probability of 0.5, whether the investment that subjects were go-
ing to make would be successful with probability 1 or with probability 0.8
only.2 We explained this to students by writing in the instructions that the
computer would randomly choose, by “flipping a coin,” between two urns,
Urn 1 or Urn 2. Urn 1 contained only green balls and Urn 2 contained 80
green and 20 red balls. The chosen urn, i.e., the chosen probability distri-
bution, was used for all participants and for all periods in this round. Of
course, subjects were not informed of which distribution had been selected.
After the probability distribution (urn) was chosen, subjects had to de-
cide for five times in sequence whether or not to invest in a project. For
each decision in the sequence, subjects had to act simultaneously, i.e., not
knowing what other subjects had decided to do. After all subjects had made
their first decision, the computer drew for each subject who had invested a
2Our choice of p = 1 for the good state of the world has two advantages. First, it makes
the updating process easy. Second, given that we are primarely interested in the behavior
of agents who had good experiences, it maximizes the number of interesting observations
in our experiment.
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ball from the chosen urn to decide whether the investment was successful
or not. A green ball meant that the investment was successful, and a red
ball that it was a failure. The draws were independent, i.e., keeping the urn
metaphor, balls were drawn with replacement.
After all participants had made their first decision, they were randomly
matched one to another by the software. There was an equal probability
for each subject of being matched with anyone of the other seven partici-
pants. The matching co-determined the payoﬀ of subjects who had decided
to invest. A subject would earn money by investing under two conditions:
that the computer had drawn a green ball; and–at the same time–that
the subject she was matched to had decided to invest as well.
After all 8 subjects had made their decision, they were informed of their
payoﬀ. We gave subjects £1.70 for each of the five decisions. They could
use that money to pay for the cost of the investment or just keep it, if they
decided not to invest. If they decided to invest, they had to pay a cost of
£1.64. If the investment was successful and the match invested too, a subject
earned £2; and nothing otherwise. Therefore, in the case of an investment,
the subject had two possible payoﬀs: £1.70 − £1.64 + £2 = £2.06 in the
first case; and £1.70−£1.64 +£0 = £0.06 in the other.
Agents were informed only of their payoﬀ, and nothing else. Therefore,
a subject could not distinguish whether the low payoﬀ was due to bad luck,
i.e., the red color of the ball, or to the decision of the other participant.
After learning about their payoﬀs, participants had to make their second
investment decision. They knew that the same distribution (urn) previously
chosen would be used again, but that new balls would be drawn for everyone
investing.
Subjects had to repeat this decision for 5 periods in a round. After the
fifth period of the round, each participant could see on the screen what
urn the computer had chosen in this round, the color of the balls that he
was assigned for each investment decision, and the decisions of the other
participants he was matched with in each of the five periods. The computer
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also showed the total payoﬀ for that round, i.e., the sum of the payoﬀs
obtained in each period.
After the first round was over, we repeated the same procedure for the
second round: At the beginning the computer chose again one of the two
distributions and students made their five decisions. The same for a total
of 15 rounds.
3.2 Treatments
We ran two treatments for this experiment. The procedures for the first
treatment (“Treatment A,” from now on) were as described in the previous
section. In addition to that, we asked subjects to write down their beliefs,
i.e., what their expected value of the investment was. In particular, in each
period, we asked students how much, at most, they would have paid for the
investment. They could choose on the screen a number between £0 and £2
with ticks of 1 penny. We did so in order to understand how beliefs evolved
over time. Notice, in fact, that the decision of a subject to invest (not to
invest) only tells us that he thought the investment was worth more (less)
than its cost (£1.64) but it does not reveal the precise value he attaches
to the investment. We did not provide monetary incentives for this task as
the true value of the investment depends on both, a subject’s (posterior)
belief about the chosen urn and his expectation about others’ investment
behavior. As we cannot control for the latter, it is impossible to rely on
incentive mechanisms for this task.3
In the other treatment (“TreatmentB”) we included a feature that would
help subjects to coordinate on the Pareto optimal equilibrium. Remember
that our primary interest was studying behavior when there is full coor-
dination. We were interested in observing the behavior of subjects after
some successful experiences. After all, this is a key implication of the the-
3 Interestingly and somewhat surprisingly, Joep Sonnemans and Theo Oﬀerman (2001)
show for a task where correct beliefs can be specified that subjects’ actual beliefs can be
as accurately elicited without incentives as with a quadratic scoring rule.
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oretical model: agents may quit investing because of fear that others do
so (despite having made only positive experiences on their own). If no one
invests all the times, there is no possibility of such observations. Therefore,
to help subjects to coordinate on the PEPBE described in the Proposition,
we forced subjects in Treatment B to invest in Period 1. We explained to
them that to invest in Period 1 was the right thing to do if everyone did so,
and disabled the “don’t invest” button for that period. Therefore, in this
treatment, subjects actually had to make only four decisions, from the 2nd
to the 5th period. Furthermore, we told them that whenever they decided
not to invest, they would not have the opportunity to invest again in later
periods of that round.4 We imposed this constraint to avoid early coordi-
nation failures. In other words, we made the decision of not investing being
definitive, so that subjects would think seriously whether it was the right
decision or not.5
4 Results
We start by describing the aggregate investment decisions over time in Treat-
ment A. Table 1 shows the proportion of investment decisions for all five
periods averaged over all rounds. These proportions are compared with those
that would occur in the Pareto—optimal equilibrium, given the realization of
the chance moves, i.e., the frequency of the two urns.
Table 1 reveals two striking features of the data–departing from the
Pareto—eﬃcient equilibrium investment rates. First, there is a tremendous
amount of coordination failure. Less than half of the decisions in the first
period are investments. Second, there is no sharp drop in investment rates
4This eliminated all PEPBE outcomes, except for the one described in the Proposition,
so the the PEPBE of the game was unique.
5By changing two aspects from Treatment A to Treatment B, we will not be able
to assess the individual eﬀects of a) forcing subjects to invest in the first period and b)
making non—investment definitive. We are simply not interested in studying the isolated
consequences of these specific design features. All we wanted to achieve is to design a
treatment where coordination failure is not an issue. And as we shall see below, Treatment
B was successful in achieving this.
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Aggregate Data A Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
PEPBE
Investment Rates
1 0.91 0 0 0
Observed
Investment Rates
0.44 0.38 0.33 0.29 0.28
Observations 600 600 600 600 600
Table 1: PEPBE and observed investment rates in Treatment A.
Only Successes A Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
PEPBE
Investment Rates
1 0 N/A N/A
Observed
Investment Rates
0.94 0.93 0.94 1.00
Observations 134 74 49 33
Table 2: PEPBE and observed investment rates for subjects who have only
experienced successes in Treatment A.
in Period 3, in which even optimistic subjects should stop investing. In fact,
the decline in investment rates is slow and steady over all five periods.
To explain this pattern we looked at subjects’ decisions after histories of
successful or unsuccessful investments. Table 2 shows the investment rates of
subjects who had only experienced successes in the previous periods. Table
3 shows the same for subjects who had experienced a failure in the previous
period. From these two tables, a very simple pattern emerges: Subjects
keep investing as long as they are successful. Once they experience a failure,
their propensity to invest drops–on average to less than 60 percent.
This behavioral pattern is also reflected in the belief data that we elicited.
In Figure 1, we plot the PEPBE (downward sloping curve) and reported
(upward sloping curve) beliefs for subjects who were always successful when
investing in the previous periods. In the PEPBE the expected value of
the investment decreases over time. In Period 3 it becomes lower than the
cost and, therefore, from Period 3 on, in equilibrium, agents attach a value
of 0 to the investment, as all agents decide not to invest. The reported
12
Previous Failure A Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
PEPBE
Investment Rates
0 0 N/A N/A
Observed
Investment Rates
0.58 0.57 0.58 0.60
Observations 132 116 92 96
Table 3: PEPBE and observed investment rates for subjects who have ex-
perienced a failure in the previous period in Treatment A.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2 3 4 5
Actual beliefs PEPBE beliefs
Figure 1: PEPBE and observed average beliefs about the expected value of
an investment, given a history that consists of successes only.
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Aggregate Data B Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
PEPBE
Investment Rates
1 .90 0 0 0
Observed
Investment Rates
1 0.94 0.87 0.77 0.66
N 600 600 600 600 600
Table 4: PEPBE and observed investment rates in Treatment B.
beliefs are in stark contrast to this. In Period 2 subjects on average valued
the investment at £1.7, almost identical to the full coordination value of
£1.68. After experiencing successes, however, subjects are more and more
optimistic, becoming increasingly confident that the true state is the good
one and that other subjects would keep investing, too.
A pattern of increasing confidence might be expected if there is initial
uncertainty about the level of coordination in the population, yielding lower
expected returns at first, and then subsequent increasing confidence as fears
of lacking coordination are dispelled. Such a sequence of beliefs, however,
would be bounded above by the beliefs from the PEPBE. And as reported
beliefs rise above those of the PEPBE, it is clear that subjects are updating
in the wrong direction.
While these data draw a rather coherent picture of subjects’ behavior in
Treatment A, they are not ideally suited for comparison with the PEPBE
given in the Proposition. There is simply too much coordination failure
early on. In a second treatment, we utilized devices discussed above to
help subjects to coordinate, in particular, making subjects invest in the first
period.
Table 4 shows aggregate investment rates over time for this treatment.
Tables 5 and 6 show the investment rates for subjects who had only successes
and for subjects who experienced a failure in the preceding period.
Several observations are in order. First, the coordination in the first
period has a tremendous eﬀect for the later periods. Once coordinated,
subjects keep coordinating. This result is similar to earlier findings on the
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Only Successes B Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
PEPBE
Investment Rates
1 0 N/A N/A
Observed
Investment Rates
.94 .97 .98 .94
Observations 540 440 361 290
Table 5: PEPBE and observed investment rates for subjects who have only
experienced successes in Treatment B.
Previous Failure B Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
PEPBE
Investment Rates
0 0 N/A N/A
Observed
Investment Rates
0.87 0.64 0.53 0.60
Observations 60 84 101 98
Table 6: PEPBE and observed investment rates for subjects who have ex-
perienced a failure in the previous period in Treatment B.
importance of the first few periods for the entire trajectory of play (see, for
example, John B. van Huyck, Raymond C. Battalio, and Richard O. Beil
1991, or van Huyck, Joseph B. Cook, and Battalio 1997).
Second, the decline in investment rates mirrors the decline observed in
Treatment A in that it is steady and slow. Moreover, there is no sudden
drop—oﬀ in the investment rate in Period 3. Third, subjects seem to apply
the same decision rules as in Treatment A. They keep investing as long
as investments are successful. Once discouraged, the investment rate drops
with some inertia to almost the same numbers as in Treatment A.
The data that we have described so far refer to the entire experiment
and one may wonder whether there is any time trend in the data, perhaps
toward the PEPBE. Analyzing the last few rounds separately, however, we
see that behavior is remarkably stable over time. Subjects stick to their
simple heuristic throughout the experiment. In Tables 7 and 8 we report
the investment decisions in the last five rounds of the fifteen—round sessions.
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Only Successes
(last five rounds)
Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
Observed
Investment Rates A
0.89 0.95 1 1
Observed
Investment Rates B
0.97 0.94 0.99 1
Table 7: Observed investment rates for subjects who have only experienced
successes in the last five rounds of the two treatments.
Previous Failure
(last five rounds)
Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
Observed
Investment Rates A
0.32 0.61 0.80 0.67
Observed
Investment Rates B
0.86 0.60 0.44 0.58
Table 8: Observed investment rates for subjects who have only experienced
successes in the last five rounds of the two treatments.
Even at the end of the experiment, subjects in both treatments invested
almost always after having experienced successes; and significantly reduced
their propensity to invest after a failure.
All the previous analysis refers to data aggregated over all participants.
To shed more light on subjects’ behavior, we also looked at individual de-
cisions. Table 9 illustrates how subjects reacted to a successful investment.
In particular, it divides subjects according to their diﬀerent propensities to
invest after a success. Behavior is remarkably homogeneous: Almost 70% of
subjects in Treatment A and more than 80% in Treatment B re—invest in
more than 80% of all cases after a success. Table 10 shows how subjects re-
acted to failures. Behavior here is clearly more heterogeneous. While there
is hardly anybody with an investment rate of less than 20% after a failure,
the distribution of investment rates above 20% is almost uniform–with a
slight bias toward more pessimistic behavior in Treatment A and toward
more optimistic behavior in Treatment B.
In all, the data from the two treatments draw a clear picture of subjects’
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Percentage of Investments
after a Success
Treatment A Treatment B
[0, 20) 0 0.025
[20,40) 0.065 0.025
[40,60) 0.16 0.025
[60,80) 0.097 0.075
[80,100] 0.68 0.85
Table 9: Individual decisions: subjects are divided according to the percent-
age of times in which they invested after a success in the previous period.
Percentage of Investments
after a Failure
Treatment A Treatment B
[0, 20) 0.09 0.075
[20,40) 0.33 0.15
[40,60) 0.18 0.175
[60,80) 0.21 0.2
[80,100] 0.18 0.4
Table 10: Individual decisions: subjects are divided according to the per-
centage of times in which they invested after a failure in the previous period.
behavior. After a success, they all keep investing–which is quite at odds
with the Pareto eﬃcient equilibrium. After a failure, they reduce their
propensity to invest. Some subjects do this very drastically, while others
reduce their investment rates in a more moderate manner. Together, by
relying on such simple backward-looking heuristics, subjects avoid economic
collapse. It is worthwhile to note that by investing more than they should,
subjects provide a substantial public good for all the others because of the
rather big externalities of investments. As a consequence of this, the subjects
in Treatment B (where there is practically no coordination failure) earn
almost as much as they would have in the PEPBE (£8.57 versus £8.67).
Basically, it is subjects’ inability to apply Bayesian equilibrium reasoning
that “protects” them from experiencing a collapse. Subjects seem unable
to put themselves in others’ shoes, to imagine that others might have had a
diﬀerent past than they themselves. This ignorance appears quite similar to
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what has been observed in some experiments on “informational cascades”
(as proposed in the seminal contributions by Abhijit Banerjee 1992, and
Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch 1992). Experimental
studies on cascades have sometimes found support for the Bayesian equilib-
rium prediction and sometimes not. Recent evidence in a paper by Dorothea
Kübler and Georg Weizsäcker (2003) suggests that the same behavioral rule
can explain both, the theory’s successes and its failures. The key feature
of the behavioral rule Kübler and Weizsäcker identify is that subjects basi-
cally fail to understand that others whom they observe and from whom they
learn have also learned from others whom they, in turn, had observed. Put
diﬀerently, subjects do extract information from their predecessors’ actions,
but they do not take into account that their predecessors did the same. A
similar failure of understanding the experience and reasoning of others also
causes the discrepancy between equilibrium and observed play in our exper-
iment: Subjects who were successful appear to have diﬃculties to imagine
that others might have experienced failures.
5 Conclusions
In Jeitschko and Taylor’s model sudden economic collapse can result from
pure “fear.” Even in a booming economy where all agents experienced good
returns on all investments all the time a collapse can occur. Agents may quit
investing not only because of their own bad experiences but also because they
are afraid that others might have had bad experiences or even because they
are afraid that others are afraid that others may have had bad experiences.
And so on–even if nobody actually had a bad experience. In that sense
it is “fear itself” (without any fundamentals being bad) that can induce an
economic meltdown in Jeitschko and Taylor’s analysis.
In this paper we have investigated whether such “Bayesian fear” can be
observed in the laboratory. The answer is that it is not. Subjects are persis-
tently optimistic as long as their own experiences are good. Jeitschko and
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Taylor point out in the conclusion to their paper that anything that increases
the population’s confidence may help in averting a complete breakdown in
investment. In our experiment, it is subjects’ “blind” optimism that in-
deed raises confidence and does avert economic breakdown. And while such
behavior is not individually rational, averting breakdown is on average ben-
eficial to the population, as in expectation investments are profitable. The
heuristics described in this paper do exactly this. Continued investment,
sometimes even after bad news, slows down attrition and thus raises the
confidence of continued investment activity and, ultimately, collective pay-
oﬀs. That is, the individual reduction in payoﬀs experienced in using an
optimistic heuristic compared to equilibrium play can be fully compensated
by the positive network externality of continued play so that the population
as a whole does quite well.
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Appendix: Instructions for Treatment A
Welcome to our experiment!
Please be quiet during the entire experiment. Do not talk to your neigh-
bours and do not try to look at their screens. Simply concentrate on what
you have to do.
If you have a question, please raise your hand. We will come to you and
answer it privately.
You are participating in an economics experiment in which you interact
with seven other participants for 15 rounds. Depending on your choices,
the other participants’ choices and some luck you can earn a considerable
amount of money. You will receive the money immediately after the exper-
iment. Notice that all participants have the same instructions.
The experiment
What you have to do
The experiment consists of a series of 15 rounds. In each round you
have to make five decisions. More specifically, you will be asked 5 times
in sequence if you want to make an investment or not. If you make an
investment, you will have to pay a cost of £1.64. The investment can be
either successful or not. If it is successful, you can earn £2. After each
investment decision, you will be informed about your payoﬀ.
What determines whether the investment is successful or not
Imagine two urns. Urn 1 contains only green balls. Urn 2 contains 80
green and 20 red balls. At the beginning of each round the computer will
randomly choose one of the two urns by tossing a coin. That is, both urns
are equally likely to be chosen. However, we will not tell you which urn the
computer has chosen!
Once an urn has been chosen for a round this urn will be used to deter-
mine the success of all investment decisions within this round. (Remember
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there are 5 such decisions in each round.) After each investment decision
the computer will randomly draw one ball of the chosen urn for each partic-
ipant. If you are assigned a green ball, your investment is successful, if it is
red it is unsuccessful.
Notice that if the computer initially chooses urn 1, the investment will
always be successful. On the other hand, if it chooses urn 2, the investment
will, on average, be only successful 80 times out of 100. Notice that there
will be separate draws for each of your investment decisions and for each
participant. That is, it is possible that an investment is successful for you
and unsuccessful for another participant or vice versa.
How do you pay for an investment?
We give you £1.70 each time you have an investment opportunity. You
may use this money to pay for the cost of the investment or you can just
keep it if you decide not to invest.
What do you earn if you decide to invest?
If the investment is unsuccessful, its value is zero – regardless of what
other subjects decide to do. Therefore, in this case, if you decided to invest,
you lose £1.64 from the £1.70 you received from us. And you keep 6 pence.
If, on the contrary, the investment is successful, its value depends on the
decisions of other subjects. After you have made your decision (invest or
not) the computer will randomly match you with one of the other 7 subjects
in the experiment. If this subject has decided to invest too, then you will
receive £2. But if the other participant has decided not to invest, you will
receive nothing. Therefore, in the former case your total payoﬀ from this
investment decision is what you have kept from the money we gave you (1.70
— 1.64) = 6 pence plus the pound you get from the successful investment. So,
your total would be £2.06. In the latter case (where you have been matched
with somebody who didn’t invest) your payoﬀ is (1.70 — 1.64) + 0 = 6
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pence. In other words, you will earn money by investing if the investment
is successful for you and if the other participant matched with you has also
decided to invest. Notice that although you can lose £1.64 by making an
investment, your payoﬀ for each investment will never be negative, as we
give you £1.70 for each investment opportunity.
What do you earn if you decide not to invest?
If you decide not to invest, you will neither earn nor lose anything. You
will just keep your £1.70.
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Procedures for each round
Remember that the experiment is organized into diﬀerent rounds and
that within each round you will have to make five investment decisions. So,
let us summarize what happens within each round.
1) At the beginning of each round the computer randomly chooses one of
the two urns, urn 1 or urn 2. The chosen urn will be used for all participants
and all investment decisions in this particular round. But you will not be
told which urn has been chosen.
2) Now you make your first decision: either invest or not.
3) If you have invested in 2), the computer draws a ball from the urn
that was chosen in stage 1). The ball is drawn and then replaced, so that the
total number of balls in the urn is always the same. The colour of the ball
that was chosen for you determines whether your investment is successful or
not. If it is green: success; if red: failure.
4) You will be randomly matched with another participant. If you
haven’t invested this is irrelevant for you. If you have invested and if your
investment was successful in 3), your payoﬀ depends on whether the other
participant you have been matched with has also invested. If he has, you
earn £2, if he hasn’t you get nothing.
5) You will be informed about what has happened to your investment,
i.e., about your payoﬀ.
6) Now you make your second investment decision. Notice that the same
urn that has determined your success previously will be used again. But a
new ball will be drawn from that urn.
In other words, from 6) onwards everything is the same as from 2) on.
This will be repeated 5 times. Your total payoﬀ from the 5 decisions is just
the sum of all payoﬀs you earned for each decision.
Once the first round is over, you will be informed of what urn the com-
puter chose, the colour of the balls that it assigned to you, the decisions of
the other participants that you were matched with and your payoﬀ. Then,
24
we will repeat the same procedure for the second round at the beginning
of which the computer will choose again one of the two urns. And we will
repeat the same procedures for the whole sequence of 5 investment decisions.
One more question
Whenever you have to decide whether to invest or not, we will also ask
you another question: How much, at most, would you pay for the invest-
ment?
You know that the true cost of the investment is £1.64. Therefore,
whenever you decide to invest, it’s clear that you think the investment is
worth an amount bigger than £1.64. What is this amount? That is, up
to which cost would you be willing to pay for the investment? Similarly,
whenever you decide not to invest, clearly you believe that the investment
is worth an amount lower than £1.64. Again we ask you what this amount
is. What is the highest cost for which you would be willing to invest?
Note that if you are successful the investment is worth £2, as this is the
amount that we pay you. So if you were sure of obtaining success, clearly
the investment would always be worth £2. On the other hand, if you were
sure of being unsuccessful, then clearly the investment would be worth 0,
as in case of failure we pay you nothing. Therefore, the true value of the
investment cannot be more than £2 and cannot be less than £0. Given that
you do not know with certainty what the true situation is, the value of the
investment has to be between 0 and 2. For this reason, on your screen you
can select any number between £0.00 and £2.00.
Examples of per round payoﬀ
Example 1
Suppose that for this round the computer has chosen urn 1. Therefore
all balls are green. Suppose you make the following decisions:
INVEST, INVEST, INVEST, NO, NO
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Suppose, finally, that in the first two times you are matched with some-
one who invested, but in the third you are matched with someone who did
not invest. Your payoﬀs would be:
206+206+6+170+170=758.
In this round, you earn money with the first 2 investments but you
lose money with the third, despite all balls were green, because your match
decided not to invest. The fourth and fifth times you just kept your 1.70
pence.
Example 2
Suppose for this round the computer has chosen urn 2. Therefore 80 out
of 100 balls are green. Suppose you make the following decisions:
INVEST, INVEST, INVEST, INVEST, NO
Suppose, finally, that you received a green ball in the first 3 cases but not
in the fourth. Suppose, finally, that you were always matched with someone
who invested. Your payoﬀs would be:
206+206+206+6+170=794.
In this round, you earn money with the first 3 investments but you loose
money with the fourth, because you got the red ball, i.e., your investment
was not successful. The fifth time you just kept your 1.70 pence.
Final payment
For the simple fact that you showed up in time for the experiment you
earn £4. The rest of the payment depends on how you perform. The com-
puter will randomly choose one round out of the first 5 rounds, one among
the 6th through the 10th and one among the 11th though the 15th. Your
payment will depend on how you performed in the selected rounds. We will
sum up your payoﬀs in these three rounds and divide the sum by 3. Your
final payment will be equal to this amount plus the £4 for showing up.
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